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Abstract 10 
 11 
Factors influencing the abilities of different animals to use cooperative social cues from humans are still unclear, 12 
in spite of long-standing interest in the topic. One of the few species that have been found successful at using 13 
human pointing is the African elephant (Loxodonta africana); despite few opportunities for learning about 14 
pointing, elephants follow a pointing gesture in an object-choice task, even when the pointing signal and 15 
experimenter’s body position are in conflict, and when the gesture itself is visually subtle. Here we show that 16 
the success of captive African elephants at using human pointing is not restricted to situations where the 17 
pointing signal is sustained until the time of choice: elephants followed human pointing even when the pointing 18 
gesture was withdrawn before they had responded to it. Furthermore, elephants rapidly generalised their 19 
response to a type of social cue they were unlikely to have seen before: pointing with the foot.  However, unlike 20 
young children, they showed no sign of evaluating the ‘rationality’ of this novel pointing gesture according to its 21 
visual context: that is, whether the experimenter’s hands were occupied or not.   22 
 23 
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Introduction 26 
 27 
The extent to which non-human animals understand and adapt their behaviour to human social signals is a 28 
question which has received much attention. The case of Clever Hans, the horse that seemed to be capable of 29 
counting and solving arithmetic problems, is one such early example where an animal perceived and responded 30 
to ‘certain postures and movements of the questioner’, signs which were ‘given involuntarily by all the persons 31 
involved and without any knowledge on their part that they were giving any such signs’ (Pfungst, 1911, p. 88). 32 
Clever Hans has long served as a warning to researchers studying the cognition of non-human animals against 33 
underestimating or ignoring the potential impact of human signals, unconscious or otherwise, on animal 34 
behaviour. The systematic study of animals’ use of human social signals has focused on what is thought to be a 35 
uniquely human gesture (Povinelli and Davis 1994; Tomasello et al. 2007): pointing with an extended arm and 36 
index finger. Human infants point and comprehend pointing by others from a young age (Behne et al. 2012). 37 
Although animals in captivity in some cases do point for humans (Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; Leavens & 38 
Hopkins, 1999; Gómez, 2007), even without explicit training to do so (Leavens and Hopkins 1998), there is 39 
little evidence that any species naturally uses an intentional pointing gesture to redirect the attention of others 40 
(but see Hobaiter, Leavens, & Byrne, 2013 for possible whole-hand pointing by wild chimpanzees).  41 
 42 
A typical context in which animals are tested for their ability to use human pointing is the ‘object-choice task’ 43 
(e.g. Anderson, Sallaberry, & Barbier, 1995). The object-choice task requires the animal to choose between one 44 
of several containers, when an experimenter points to one of the containers where food is hidden. Using the 45 
object-choice task, it has been found that domestic animals including goats (Kaminski et al. 2005), cats (Miklósi 46 
et al. 2005), horses (Proops et al. 2010) and especially dogs (Miklósi et al. 1998; Hare and Tomasello 1999; 47 
Hare et al. 2002; Soproni et al. 2002; Miklósi et al. 2005) tend to be successful at using human pointing to find 48 
hidden food. Domestic animals’ successful interpretation of pointing has led to the suggestion that the ability to 49 
respond to human social cues evolved during the process of domestication (Hare et al. 2002), possibly as a by-50 
product of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression (Hare et al. 2005). Dogs have been found more 51 
skilful at interpreting human signals than are wolves (Hare et al., 2002; Miklósi et al., 2003), supporting the 52 
theory that the ability to read human social signals evolved during domestication. Non-human primates’ use of 53 
human deictic signals in the object-choice task has produced conflicting results. In many instances captive non-54 
human primates have been found not to interpret pointing correctly when using only their pre-experimental 55 
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knowledge (capuchin monkeys, Anderson et al., 1995; rhesus macaques, Anderson, Montant, & Schmitt, 1996; 56 
cotton-top tamarins, Neiworth, Burman, Basile, & Lickteig, 2002; chimpanzees, Hare et al., 2002; chimpanzees, 57 
orangutans, Tomasello, Call, & Gluckman, 1997). While there are individual apes of all species that have been 58 
found to successfully respond to human-given social cues in the object-choice task, these were predominantly 59 
individuals that had extensive experimental experience or had been raised in socio-communicatively rich 60 
environments (chimpanzees, Povinelli et al. 1990; Povinelli et al. 1992; Itakura and Tanaka 1998; Povinelli et al. 61 
1999; Itakura et al. 1999; Mulcahy and Call 2009; Lyn et al. 2010; bonobos, Mulcahy and Call 2009; Lyn et al. 62 
2010; gorillas, Peignot and Anderson 1999; and orangutans, Call and Tomasello 1994; Tomasello et al. 1997; 63 
Itakura and Tanaka 1998). At the functional level, non-human apes’ relatively poor performance is thought to be 64 
influenced by the inherently cooperative nature of this task, where food is helpfully pointed out to them: a 65 
situation which apes are unlikely to be familiar with from their own interactions with conspecifics (Hare 2001; 66 
Hare and Tomasello 2004); but inconsistencies in the methods used between species (reviewed in: Miklósi and 67 
Soproni 2006; Mulcahy and Hedge 2012) complicate interpretation of the mixed results. Nevertheless, the 68 
ability to follow human pointing is certainly not exclusive to domestic animals (e.g. seals, Scheumann & Call, 69 
2004; dolphins, Herman et al., 1999, Pack & Herman, 2004; megachiropteran bats, Hall, Udell, Dorey, Walsh, & 70 
Wynne, 2011), and an alternative explanation has been proposed: that successful domestication was limited to 71 
species that naturally attended to and reacted appropriately to the cues that humans use to communicate, thus 72 
making them suitable for potential domestication (Smet and Byrne 2013). The latter theory was supported by the 73 
results from a study we carried out with African elephants (Loxodonta africana) (Smet and Byrne 2013).  74 
 75 
Elephants have never been domesticated, they are taken from the wild and tamed; yet these behaviourally and 76 
genetically wild animals have a long history of successful use by humans (Lair 1997), suggesting that they have 77 
desirable qualities for forming a working relationship with people. We found that African elephants correctly 78 
interpreted human pointing: including when the experimenter’s body orientation gave a cue which conflicted 79 
with the direction of her pointing gesture, by standing beside the empty container in an object-choice task; as 80 
well as when pointing was visually subtle (Smet and Byrne 2013). However, all social cues were given 81 
continuously: the experimenter pointed in plain view of the subject and then maintained the pointing gesture 82 
until the subject had chosen one of the two containers, when the trial ended. Thus, in that study elephants could 83 
solve the object-choice task by orienting to the baited container through constantly referring to the continuous 84 
vector provided by the experimenter’s pointing arm. It has been argued (e.g. Miklósi & Soproni, 2006) that 85 
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leaving the arm extended in this way allows animals to rely on a quite different mechanism than deictic 86 
communication for success: the unchanging physical cues, such as an outstretched human hand, act as a guide to 87 
the location where food is likely to be found, because it is always found in that location in conjunction with that 88 
particular physical cue. In order to test animals in a situation which reflects real communication more closely, 89 
the signaller should produce a discrete gesture, which, having been perceived by the receiver at the time it is 90 
given, then becomes unavailable to the receiver before they act upon it (Miklósi and Soproni 2006). In the 91 
object-choice task this can be done by pointing only before the subject chooses a container. Dogs, cats (Miklósi 92 
et al. 2005), dolphins (Herman et al. 1999; Pack and Herman 2004) and a seal (Shapiro et al. 2003) show a small 93 
decrease or no decrease in their performance when a pointing signal is given only briefly compared with 94 
continuous presentation. When Asian elephants were tested on momentary pointing, where the pointing signal 95 
was given by a human experimenter for 5s before being withdrawn, the elephants did not choose the indicated 96 
container above chance (Plotnik et al. 2013); however, 5s may be insufficient for the elephant always to have 97 
registered the signal. In our first experiment, we test whether African elephants can follow a pointing cue even 98 
when it is not given continuously until the choice is made, to establish whether they need to continually refer to 99 
the pointing signal or whether they interpret its meaning and then respond to it; but we avoid the use of an 100 
arbitrary and brief presentation time.  101 
 102 
While elephants appear to spontaneously interpret pointing by a human experimenter as an intentional signal, it 103 
is unclear whether they understand anything about the rationality of the experimenter’s communicative action. 104 
Fourteen-month-old infants have been found capable of making judgements about the rationality of adult 105 
behaviour in the context of deciding which actions to imitate (Gergely et al. 2002). When infants watched an 106 
adult demonstrator switching on a lamp using her head, rather than hand, they were more likely to copy the 107 
demonstrator’s method of switching on the lamp if she had her arms free when demonstrating the method, 108 
compared to when she demonstrated while her arms were occupied because she had wrapped a blanket around 109 
her body. Presumably, infants inferred some unknown reason for using the strange method when the 110 
demonstrator’s hands were free during the demonstration, but when her hands were occupied then using an 111 
alternative method was obligatory, and infants did not judge that the unusual method was necessary to copy 112 
(Gergely et al. 2002).  Enculturated chimpanzees were also found to imitate a human demonstrator operating an 113 
apparatus with an unusual body part (pressing it with his foot, forehead, or sitting on it) more frequently when 114 
the demonstrator’s hands were free during the demonstration, implying that the human chose the strange method 115 
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freely; compared to when his hands were occupied during the demonstration, implying that he was forced to use 116 
some alternative method because he was unable to use the preferred method (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 117 
Tomasello, 2007, but see also Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2008). In our second experiment, we 118 
test whether elephants can discern the intentions of a human experimenter, based on the rationality of her action. 119 
If elephants attend to the rationality of others’ actions, they should be less likely to follow a novel referential 120 
signal that appears irrational, because they should interpret it as an arbitrary movement rather than an intentional 121 
signal. 122 
 123 
General method 124 
 125 
Subjects and housing 126 
A total of nine captive African savannah elephants participated in these experiments, n=8 in each study with the 127 
eighth subject replaced for Experiment 2. The subjects were housed at an adventure-safari operator in Victoria 128 
Falls, Zimbabwe. The elephants had been trained to respond to verbal commands but not visual gestures, using 129 
only positive reinforcement. When these elephants are feeding in the bush, their handlers are often out of sight 130 
and so the use of verbal commands allows handlers to direct the elephants from a distance, as well as when they 131 
are on their backs during the elephant-back rides. Apart from participating in experiments, these elephants take 132 
tourists on elephant-back safaris; usually two rides per day. All nine of the elephants had previous experimental 133 
experience: some had participated in a relative quantity judgment study and all had been tested on their use of a 134 
variety of human social signals (see Smet & Byrne, 2013 for further details on their rearing histories and 135 
training experiences).  136 
 137 
Materials 138 
We used two pink opaque plastic buckets (diameter 30 cm, height 45 cm) to hide the food. To conceal the 139 
baiting process from the subject, in Experiment 1 we used a large board (70 x 60 cm). The experimenter (AFS, 140 
hereafter referred to as E) stood at 3m distance and checked whether she could see into the buckets from an 141 
approximate ‘elephant eye-level’ of three metres, so we were confident the elephants could not see the baiting 142 
over the board. In Experiment 2 this board was replaced by a rectangular cloth to conceal the baiting process, as 143 
we were concerned that some of the elephants were reacting nervously to the board being pushed over, and two 144 
wooden trays (50 cm x 50 cm) were used to indicate more clearly where to put the buckets after baiting. We 145 
7 
 
used pieces of melon or orange of approximately 10 cm long as the food reward. A large brown blanket with a 146 
red and white stripe was used to occupy E’s arms in Experiment 2.   147 
 148 
Design 149 
We used a within-subjects design where each elephant participated in trials of every treatment. Trials of the 150 
different treatments were presented in pseudo-randomised order, and for each condition food placement was 151 
randomised and placed on each side an equal number of times. In every session we used both types of fruit as a 152 
reward, changing randomly between the two to ensure the elephants were motivated. 153 
 154 
General procedure 155 
We will describe minor deviations from the general methods where they apply in each of our two experiments. 156 
At the start of a session the subject was positioned 3-4 m away from where the buckets were placed, 157 
approximately 1.5 m apart. The subject’s starting point was marked by two rocks, one on either side of the 158 
subject. Handlers always stood to the left of their elephants and prevented them from approaching too early. A 159 
pre-test was run with each subject at the start of each experimental session, to ensure that subjects were 160 
motivated and to habituate them to the procedure where they would only be allowed to choose one of the 161 
containers per trial. In the pre-test, E walked up centrally between the two buckets and dropped a piece of fruit 162 
into one of them in plain view of the subject. After the subject had chosen the container with the food in it three 163 
times in a row it progressed to the test phase. In the test phase the subject did not know the location of the food: 164 
baiting was done by E so that the subject could not see where the food was going, because of the position of the 165 
board (Experiment 1) or cloth (Experiment 2), which obscured the buckets when they were placed together 166 
during baiting.  E always did the baiting in these two studies, by putting her two closed fists into each of the two 167 
buckets simultaneously, but leaving only one piece of food in one of the buckets. When baiting was complete, E 168 
pushed over the board or lifted the cloth, and put the buckets in their positions 1.5 metres apart. She then walked 169 
up between the two containers, and, standing just behind them, got the attention of the subject by calling its 170 
name or making some other sound and executed the social cue required for that trial. As in normal human 171 
pointing, E alternated the direction of her head- and eye-gaze by turning her head back and forth between the 172 
baited container and the subject for the entire duration that she was pointing on the test trials. The subject was 173 
instructed to approach by the handler (using the command ‘move up’) and the first bucket that it touched or that 174 
its trunk entered was coded as its choice and the other bucket then removed. If it had chosen correctly, it was 175 
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allowed to consume its food reward before being instructed to return to the starting position. If it had chosen 176 
incorrectly then the handler instructed it to return to the starting position immediately (using the command ‘back 177 
up’). Trials were recorded using a Panasonic HDC-SD90 camcorder on a tripod. Elephants’ choices were noted 178 
after each trial and then checked against the video material.  179 
 180 
 181 
Data analysis 182 
We tested data for normality and used non-parametric tests if data deviated appreciably from normal. All p-183 
values are compared to an alpha-level of 0.05. Where Wilcoxon’s signed rank test is used, we report exact 184 
significance values.  185 
 186 
 187 
Experiment 1 188 
In this study we tested whether elephants could choose the indicated container without the experimenter 189 
pointing continually to where it was hidden. The experimenter pointed to the baited container, and the subject’s 190 
handler made a decision about whether that elephant had seen the signal. When the handler decided the subject 191 
had seen the pointing signal (Online Resource 1), he instructed it to advance and in certain trials E dropped her 192 
pointing arm to her side, so that the pointing signal was no longer visible as the subject approached the 193 
containers and touched one of the two.  194 
 195 
Method 196 
We presented eight elephants with a total of 80 trials each, consisting of two different types of social cue (40 197 
trials each), each of two modes of presentation in randomised order (20 trials each for each type of pointing cue).  198 
The two different types of social cue were: 199 
1. Whole-arm ipsilateral pointing - E used the whole, straight, extended ipsilateral arm and index finger to 200 
point to the baited container. 201 
2. Whole-arm cross-body pointing - E used the whole, straight contralateral arm and extended index-202 
finger to point across the front of her body to the baited bucket, with the pointing hand stretching past 203 
the periphery of her body to align the entire arm with the baited container. 204 
 205 
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Both types of social cue were already familiar to all the subjects from a previous experiment (Smet and Byrne 206 
2013) but the nature of presentation differed from what the subjects had experienced in that study: because here 207 
elephants were prevented from choosing one of the two buckets until their handlers thought they had seen the 208 
pointing signal, and they had also never before been presented with a pointing cue that was unsustained. The 209 
two different types of social cues were presented in each of the following ways: 210 
1. Sustained - Pointing was sustained by E while the subject chose one of the buckets, keeping the 211 
pointing arm in place and alternating head-gaze until the subject had touched one of the buckets 212 
(Online Resource 2). 213 
2. Unsustained - E pointed while alternating head-gaze until the subject was instructed to approach. Then 214 
she stopped pointing and looked straight at the subject until it had touched one of the buckets (Online 215 
Resource 3). 216 
 217 
Each type of social cue was presented as sustained and unsustained an equal number of times. For each 218 
condition the reward was hidden equally often on the left and right side. All except one of the subjects 219 
completed all 80 trials. One that did not complete all 80 was excluded from further testing after handlers 220 
experienced behavioural difficulties with this elephant outside of the experimental context (Malasha); however, 221 
as the behavioural difficulties were unlikely to be connected to its performance in the study, its data were 222 
included for analysis.  223 
 224 
Results 225 
We found that elephants chose the baited container significantly above chance in all conditions. At the 226 
individual level, 6/8 elephants chose correctly when sustained whole-arm ipsilateral pointing indicated the 227 
baited container; 5/8 elephants when sustained whole-arm cross-body pointing was used; 5/8 elephants when 228 
unsustained whole-arm ipsilateral pointing was used; and 2/8 elephants when unsustained whole-arm cross-body 229 
pointing indicated the baited container (table 1).  230 
 231 
As a group, elephants chose the baited container significantly above chance in all of the four conditions (fig. 1) 232 
(one-sample t-tests: sustained whole-arm ipsilateral point, M = 0.80, SE = 0.06, t(7) = 5.06, p = 0.001, 233 
unsustained whole-arm ipsilateral point, M = 0.73, SE = 0.05, t(7) = 4.40, p = 0.003, sustained whole-arm cross-234 
body point, M = 0.79, SE = 0.05, t(7) = 5.61, p = 0.001, unsustained whole-arm cross-body point, M = 0.67, SE 235 
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= 0.06, t(7) = 2.60, p = 0.035). We used a 3-way repeated measures ANOVA to test for the effects of the type of 236 
social cue (whole-arm ipsilateral or cross-body pointing), the nature of its presentation (unsustained or sustained) 237 
and also whether there was any difference in subjects’ performance in the first compared to the last half of trials 238 
in each condition. Only the nature of presentation had a significant effect on the proportion of correct trials (F(1, 239 
7) = 1.54, p = 0.004) with elephants choosing correctly significantly more often when pointing was sustained (M 240 
= 0.79, SE = 0.05) than when it was unsustained (M = 0.70, SE = 0.06). There was no significant main effect of 241 
point type (F(1,7) = 1.54, p = 0.255), or of the half of trials (F(1, 7) = 0.10, p = 0.764), nor any interaction 242 
effects between type of point and nature of presentation (F(1, 7) = 0.36, p = 0.57), point type and half of trials 243 
(F(1,7) = 0.286, p = 0.609), nature of presentation and half of trials (F(1, 7) = 0.86, p = 0.386) or point type, 244 
nature of presentation and half of trials (F(1, 7) = 0.75, p = 0.414) (fig. 2). 245 
 246 
Discussion 247 
The elephants in our study used two different types of human social cues to find hidden food. They were 248 
successful not only when the social cues were sustained by the human experimenter, thus replicating our 249 
previous findings (Smet and Byrne 2013), but also when the pointing signal was withdrawn before elephants 250 
had the opportunity to act on their interpretation of the signal. We found no evidence that elephants learnt to 251 
respond to this unsustained pointing during the course of the experiment, as their performance showed no 252 
improvement over time. Although elephants did not depend on continual reference to the pointing container for 253 
their successful use of pointing, their success was reduced when they had to remember the direction of the 254 
pointing signal, compared to when it was given continually, as has been found to a lesser extent in domestic cats 255 
and dogs (Miklósi et al. 2005). Since the direction of elephant visual attention was difficult to ascertain from 256 
head or eye-gaze direction, it may be that the handler’s judgement of when a subject had seen the 257 
experimenter’s pointing gesture was not always correct. If this were the case, in some of the unsustained 258 
pointing trials elephants may have been instructed to approach before actually having seen the pointing signal. 259 
This could explain the decrease in performance we found between sustained and unsustained pointing trials for 260 
each type of pointing cue. However, in many trials, it took longer than 5s for the handler to judge that the 261 
subject had seen the gesture (Online Resource 1), and on these trials elephants would most likely have failed to 262 
respond correctly if the pointing signal was always presented for 5s as it was in the study with Asian elephants, 263 
which failed at using a 5s point to find hidden food (Plotnik et al. 2013). It is premature to rule out a species 264 
difference between African and Asian elephants’ abilities to follow human social cues, but our methodology may 265 
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have created a further advantage for our subjects.  In our study there were also many trials where handlers 266 
judged that the subject had noticed the pointing gesture in less than 5 seconds, and especially in these trials it 267 
was likely to be advantageous to our subjects that they were able to approach immediately after having seen the 268 
pointing gesture, instead of waiting for the prescribed duration of the pointing to finish, during which time their 269 
attention may have become diverted from the task at hand.  270 
 271 
Experiment 2 272 
In this study, we tested whether elephants would generalise from their understanding of human pointing to a 273 
human social signal given in a novel way: pointing with the leg. Our method was also designed to test if 274 
elephants would discriminate the rationality of an experimenter’s choice of directional gesture when responding 275 
to this novel visual signal.  276 
 277 
Method 278 
Seven of the eight subjects that participated in this study had previously participated in Experiment 1; Malasha 279 
was unavailable for testing due to behavioural difficulties and was replaced. The new eighth subject (Izibulo) 280 
had participated in a study looking at his use of human social cues prior to this experiment (Smet and Byrne 281 
2013). After the pre-test, E baited the containers for each trial as previously described and then put each of the 282 
buckets onto one of the wooden trays which were positioned a metre apart to indicate more clearly to E where 283 
the buckets should be put after baiting. When each bucket was positioned in the centre of the trays, the distance 284 
between the buckets was still 1.5 metres.  285 
 286 
We presented each subject with a total of 32 trials: eight trials for each of the four different conditions in a 287 
pseudorandomised order, with food being placed equally often on the left and the right for each condition. We 288 
used a small number of trials per condition as we were especially interested in the elephants’ first trial responses 289 
to the experimental treatments.  E selected a different starting point from the list of trials for each subject, which 290 
were in a random order. In addition to the familiar whole-arm ipsilateral point condition were two novel test 291 
conditions: the ‘rational’ leg point (Online Resource 4) and ‘irrational’ leg point (Online Resource 5). For both 292 
of these, instead of using her arm to point, E stretched the leg closest to the baited container outwards in the 293 
container’s direction, with only the toe-end of the shoe on that foot touching the ground. The difference between 294 
the ‘irrational’ and ‘rational’ conditions was that in ‘rational’ leg pointing trials E had her arms occupied because 295 
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she was holding closed a blanket which she wrapped around her entire upper body including her arms, while in 296 
the ‘irrational’ pointing trials the blanket was draped over her left shoulder and both her arms were visibly 297 
unoccupied. Note that here E always sustained the pointing cue until subjects had chosen one of the buckets. 298 
The fourth condition was a control: in control trials E did not indicate where the food was hidden but instead 299 
stood and watched the elephant until it made its choice. In these control trials E informed the handler where the 300 
food was hidden before the subject was allowed to approach, in order to test whether elephants’ choices were 301 
based on unconscious cues by handlers or the experimenter, or if they were able to smell where the food was 302 
hidden.  303 
 304 
Results 305 
Elephants chose the baited container above half the time on all experimental conditions (table 2). Because of the 306 
small number of trials for each condition we did not conduct tests for differences from chance for individual 307 
elephants.  308 
 309 
We found that elephants chose the correct container significantly more often than predicted by chance when E 310 
indicated it using a whole-arm ipsilateral point or a ‘rational’ leg point (fig. 3) (one-sample t-tests, respectively:  311 
t(7) = 4.32, p = 0.003, t(7) = 3.97, p = 0.005). When E indicated the baited container with her leg while her arms 312 
were free (‘irrational’ leg point), or did not signal at all (control), as a group the elephants chose the baited 313 
container at chance (one-sample t-tests, respectively: t(7) = 1.67, p = 0.138, t(7) = 0.40, p = 0.699) (fig. 3). 314 
However, when we compared performance at the group level across these conditions there was no significant 315 
effect of condition (repeated measures ANOVA: F(3, 21) = 2.56, p = 0.083) and on the critical comparison 316 
between the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ leg point conditions, we found no significant differences between the two 317 
(post-hoc pairwise comparisons: p = 0.381; table 2). As the results from the two conditions were not 318 
significantly different we pooled data from the two leg point conditions by dividing the total number of trials 319 
where each elephant chose correctly on either of the leg point conditions by 16, to obtain a total proportion of 320 
correct trials per subject. Using these pooled data, we found that subjects chose the baited bucket significantly 321 
above chance when E pointed to it with her leg (one-sample t-test, M = 0.66, SE = 0.05, t(7) = 2.958, p = 0.021). 322 
  323 
Finally, since the first trial data do not suggest that elephants spontaneously responded correctly to a ‘leg point’  324 
there was a possibility that the elephants learned to respond to this during the course of the study. We found that 325 
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for all our conditions subjects as a group performed slightly better on the second half of trials compared to the 326 
first (‘rational’ leg point: first half, M = 0.66, SE = 0.07, second half, M = 0.72, SE = 0.06; ‘irrational’ leg point: 327 
first half, M = 0.56, SE = 0.09, second half, M = 0.69, SE = 0.09; whole-arm ipsilateral point: first half, M = 0.63, 328 
SE = 0.11, second half,  M = 0.88, SE = 0.05, control: first half, M = 0.50, SE = 0.11, second half, M = 0.56, SE 329 
= 0.09) but in no case was this difference significant (Wilcoxon’s signed rank test: ‘rational’ leg point: T = 7, p = 330 
0.688; ‘irrational’ leg point: T = 5, p = 0.344; whole-arm ipsilateral point: T = 0, p = 0.063; repeated measures t-331 
test: control: t(7)=-0.509, p = 0.626).  332 
 333 
Discussion 334 
African elephants rapidly generalise to an entirely novel kind of pointing: pointing with the foot. However, it 335 
would seem that in this context elephants do not differentiate between an intentional communicative signal 336 
given in a novel way but with an obvious visual explanation for the strange new action, and the same action 337 
when there is no obvious reason for why it is performed in this particular way. Although we are confident that 338 
elephants in this study were familiar with the physical properties of the blanket that was used, as similar 339 
blankets were carried by handlers, often over a shoulder or wrapped around them in the mornings in cold 340 
weather, it may be that the elephants simply did not recognise that the experimenter’s hands were occupied 341 
when she wrapped the blanket around herself. Furthermore, they may not have interpreted this as a piece of 342 
contextually relevant information in deciding to interpret the leg ‘point’ as communicative. Our results are 343 
similar to what has been found in domestic dogs, which also did not discriminate between a pointing cue given 344 
with the leg when the experimenter’s hands were unoccupied, compared to when she carried a book which 345 
occupied her hands (Kaminski et al. 2011). It may be that, as thought to be the case for the domestic dogs in that 346 
study, our elephants may be so motivated to follow the human’s cues that the manner in which the human 347 
communicates is simply irrelevant (Kaminski et al. 2011). Given the large number of trials that these elephants 348 
have already been exposed to in previous studies where humans pointed to hidden food in various ways, they 349 
may have adopted the strategy of always choosing the container which is indicated by the human in some way. 350 
Since there was an extremely limited cost to choosing incorrectly, elephants would not suffer from following 351 
this strategy. Thus elephants might have come to follow social cues given by a human even if the cue is 352 
completely arbitrary, regardless of whether there is a visual reason for why a cue is given in a strange or novel 353 
manner: we therefore cannot rule out the possibility that they distinguish these reasons. 354 
 355 
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General discussion 356 
 357 
Elephants do not need continual reference to one of the containers in the object-choice task in the form of a 358 
sustained pointing gesture in order to follow a human pointing signal. They will respond correctly following a 359 
pointing signal that is given before the time that they are able to choose one of the two containers. This shows 360 
that their success at using human pointing signals is not simply because they are led to the baited container by 361 
constantly referring to the experimenter’s pointing arm as a cue to one of the two buckets. Instead, with 362 
unsustained pointing, comparable to ‘real’ communication (Miklósi and Soproni 2006), the elephants’ success 363 
suggests they interpret the human’s signal when they see it, and then respond to it. Their decline in performance, 364 
when pointing was terminated before they approached to choose, may be due to the memory load that this 365 
requires for success, in contrast to sustained pointing where there is a constant visual reminder of the direction 366 
of the signal; or may be an artefact of human error in deciding when an elephant has actually seen the signal. 367 
There is as yet no evidence that wild elephants can use the visual communicative signals of others, although 368 
elephant visual signals and gestures are well-documented (Poole and Granli 2009; Poole and Granli 2011). 369 
However, the ability to respond to the discrete communicative signals of others is likely to play an important 370 
part in elephant communication in the wild.  371 
 372 
The elephants in this study readily followed human pointing when it was presented in a novel way that they 373 
were unlikely to have seen before. However, we did not find evidence that elephants took into account the 374 
rationality of a novel gesture in their interpretation of its meaning. A possible explanation is that elephants are so 375 
motivated to follow human social signals that they always interpret human signals as communicative, and may 376 
have been further encouraged by the fact that the leg pointing signal was always accompanied by head-gaze 377 
alternation. As the possible range of responses available to the elephants in this context was limited, it is also 378 
possible that the leg point resulted in local enhancement (Thorpe 1956) to the area in space where it was carried 379 
out, rather than acting as deictic communication. If this is the case, one would predict that all animals capable of 380 
responding to local enhancement (including, for example, greylag geese, and bumblebees, reviewed in Hoppitt 381 
& Laland, 2013) will prove to be successful at using leg ‘pointing’.  382 
 383 
Elephants seem to utilise whatever social cues are available to them to infer the meaning of a gesture produced 384 
by a human. We suspect that this type of responsiveness to visual signals contributes to effective interpretation 385 
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of human communicative signals, which must always require considerable generalization from the natural 386 
signals used among elephants.   387 
 388 
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 509 
 Whole-arm ipsilateral point Whole-arm cross-body point 
 Sustained Unsustained Sustained Unsustained 
Subjects Correct/ 
total 
p = Correct/ 
total 
p = Correct/ 
total 
p = Correct/ 
total 
p = 
Coco 18/20 0.000* 15/20 0.041* 19/20 0.000* 14/20 0.115 
Doji 16/20 0.012* 12/20 0.503 13/20 0.263 12/20 0.503 
Jake 16/20 0.012* 12/20 0.503 11/20 0.824 10/20 1.000 
Jock 9/20 0.824 10/20 1.000 15/20 0.041* 8/20 0.503 
Jumbo 20/20 0.000* 17/20 0.003* 18/20 0.000* 19/20 0.000* 
Malasha 13/14 0.002* 14/15 0.001* 14/16 0.004* 13/18 0.096 
Tendai 17/20 0.003* 16/20 0.012* 18/20 0.000* 17/20 0.003* 
Tembi 14/20 0.115 16/20 0.012* 14/20 0.115 12/20 0.503 
 510 
Table 1 Individual number of trials correct for each point type and duration The table gives the number of 511 
trials in which each subject chose the baited container, compared to the total number of trials. The p-values 512 
given are for binomial tests. P-values that are significant compared to an alpha-level of .05 are indicated with an 513 
asterisk (*).See also Online Resource 1 for comparisons between first and last trials. 514 
515 
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 516 
  ‘Irrational’ leg point ‘Rational’ leg point Whole-arm 
ipsilateral point 
Control 
 Subject Trials 
correct 
out of 8 
First trial Trials 
correct 
out of 8 
First trial Trials 
correct 
out of 8 
First trial Trials 
correct 
out of 8 
First trial 
 Coco 7 Correct 7 Correct 8 Correct 5 Incorrect 
 Doji 5 Correct 5 Incorrect 6 Correct 7 Correct 
 Emily 6 Correct 7 Incorrect 5 Incorrect 3 Correct 
 Izibulo 5 Incorrect 5 Incorrect 6 Correct 4 Incorrect 
 Jake 4 Incorrect 6 Correct 4 Incorrect 4 Correct 
 Jock 2 Incorrect 5 Correct 5 Correct 5 Correct 
 Tembi 4 Incorrect 4 Incorrect 7 Incorrect 1 Incorrect 
 Tendai 7 Correct 5 Correct 7 Correct 5 Correct 
M  0.63  0.69  0.75  0.53  
SE  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.08  
 517 
Table 2 Individual and first trial performance per condition This table shows the number of trials where 518 
each elephant chose the baited container correctly on each condition, and whether they chose correctly on the 519 
first trial of a particular condition. See also Online Resource 1 for comparisons between first and last trials. The 520 
table includes the mean (M) and standard error (SE) values for each condition 521 
522 
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Note: figures created in GraphPad Prism 5.  523 
 524 
Fig. 1 Graph showing the mean proportion of correct trials for each condition As a group, subjects chose 525 
correctly significantly above chance on all conditions.  526 
 527 
Fig. 2 Graph showing the mean proportion of correct trials for the two types of social cue, and the 528 
durations of presentation, divided according to the first and second half of trials  529 
 530 
Fig. 3 Proportion of trials correct per condition Elephants chose the baited container significantly more often 531 
than predicted by chance when E pointed with a whole-arm ipsilateral point and a ‘rational’ leg point  532 
533 
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Supplementary materials: Captions 534 
 535 
Online Resource 1 Supplementary results and figures. Supplementary fig. 1. Shows the mean duration of the 536 
unsustained pointing cue in Experiment 1. Supplementary fig. 2. The number of elephants that chose correctly 537 
on the first and last trials of each condition in Experiment 1. Supplementary fig. 3. The number of elephants that 538 
chose correctly on the first and last trials of each condition in Experiment 2. 539 
Online Resource 2 Video clip from Experiment 1 showing a sustained whole-arm ipsilateral pointing trial 540 
Online Resource 3 Video clip from Experiment 1 showing an unsustained whole-arm ipsilateral pointing trial 541 
Online Resource 4 Video clip from Experiment 2 showing a ‘rational’ leg point trial 542 
Online Resource 5 Video clip from Experiment 2 showing an ‘irrational’ leg point trial 543 
 544 
